illustrates the impact of SDI on US-Soviet relations and Reagan's mission of establishing a divine imperium of freedom.
1983-1985: Reagan and Andropov, then Chernenko
On March 16, 1983, Reagan told his National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, "not to breathe a word of it to another soul, " as he instructed him to write an insert about SDI that would be merged into a speech scheduled for March 23 supporting his defense budget.
2 In a national television address Reagan, as he had claimed so often before, argued that "the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons-weapons that can strike directly at the United States, " and provided photographic evidence of their existence reminiscent of the photographs used by President John Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. Then, toward the end of the address, Reagan turned conventional thinking about deterrence and MAD upside down when he argued it was time "to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security" and announced his plan to develop defensive technologies that "could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles" before they reached our soil. He asked, "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than avenge them?" and claimed it was "our only purpose . . . to search for ways to reduce the threat of nuclear war. " He closed by suggesting, "tonight we're launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. " 3 Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov's reaction to Reagan's new initiative was swift and harsh. He characterized it as "a bid to disarm the Soviet Union" that "would actually open the floodgates to a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive." He accused Reagan of a "deliberate lie" about Soviet compliance with its freeze on deployment of missiles in Europe and that Reagan's initiative was "not just irresponsible, it is insane."
4 At the time Andropov was consolidating his power in advance of the Soviet's June Plenum, where he was also made chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He was seeking to establish a "reliable majority in the Politburo" and sought to project himself as a formidable adversary to Reagan.
5 Meanwhile, Reagan came under fire at home for his aggressive stance on SDI, and had to quell anxiety among a number of allies.
6 Shultz, who suggested he was speaking both for himself and the President, framed the strategy of SDI before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1983 as not based on trust or on a Soviet change of heart. It is based on the expectation that, faced with demonstration of the West's renewed determination to strengthen
